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SUPPORT RIGHTS AND DUTIES BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
MONRAD G. PAULSEN*
According to the common law a husband was entitled to his
wife's earnings and most of her personal property in addition to
the pleasure of her company and services in the home. These
advantages have been considered the quid pro quo for the man's
duty of support. Today, because of legislation, most of a husband's
legal control over the income and means of his wife is gone. If
a husband's duty to support is to be grounded in a reciprocal benefit
to him, that benefit is derived almost wholly from the wife's obliga-
tion to be a wife and to live with her husband. To a male, the chief
economic advantages of marriage are the voluntary contributions by
the wife whether of earnings, estate or services.
The wife's duty of cohabitation is not the only reason given for
the rules about support. One commentator has suggested that the
duty of support flows from a wife's common-law position as a near-
chattel;' another has said that the duty is founded upon feudal prin-
ciples.2 I offer another point of view. The law, especially as it is set
forth in the appellate cases, frequently gives us the picture of an
ideal. The stated rules often give a kind of reality to cherished myth.
"Ought to be" can become the basis for court action when our lives
'ccome a cropper" because of the world, the flesh and the devil. I sug-
gest that this aspect of the law's role accounts, in part, for the stated
doctrine in the support cases.
When John and Alice are married, John becomes the head of the
home and Alice the heart. John supplies the means for house and
table while Alice takes both (and John) into her charge. In the
best of worlds Alice does not leave after breakfast for a job which
may bring more money into the household than her husband's earn-
ings. It is best if she is the protected homemaker and he the protecting
provider. Alice is entitled to share John's fortune according to the
commitment phrased in the Anglican Prayer Book "for better, for
worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in health." Should John
and Alice separate, his continuing duty to maintain her depends
upon where the fault lies. If he deserts her or drives her away,
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L. REv. 28 (1935). Brown, The Duty
of the Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REV. 823 (1932), is a frequently
consulted treatment of marital support problems. Gordon, Nonsupport in Con-
necticut, 22 Co-NN. B. J. 203 (1949), and Lencher, Desertion, Maintenance and
Non-Support in the Law of Pennsylvania, 5 U. PITT. L. REV. 145 (1939), are
useful local contributions.
2. Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and Wife's Duty
to Render Services, 29 VA. L. REV. 857 (1943).
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he continues to pay; if she runs off or gives him cause to leave John's
obligation is no more. So goes my guess at a version of the ideal
which we embrace and which the legal institutions mirror.
The Doctrine
It is startling that the great ninteenth century movement to-
ward the legal equality of the marriage partners has left the duty
of the husband to support his wife so little changed. Today a
married woman's power to make a contract, run a business, convey
a lot or sue a defendant is only slightly different from that of her
husband. Yet she has (save in a few instances) no duty to contribute
funds to her husband for the support of their common home. A
husband has often argued but always without success that the
Married Woman's Property Acts have operated to relieve him of
the primary duty to support his wife and family.3 The result is
all the more startling when we consider not merely a married woman's
modern legal position but also her increasingly important economic
role. Millions of women work and contribute voluntarily to the mari-
tal enterprise. It is a fair guess that in most youthful marriages both
parties are employed for a time. In fact, among married students, the
wife commonly provides the means while the husband finishes his
education. Opportunities for money making are almost as plentiful
and as attractive for women as they are for men.
4
The legal emancipation of women and the economic realities
have not changed the fundamental: a husband has the primary
duty of supporting his wife. The duty of support remains upon
the husband even if the wife herself is possessed of great means.5
In Churchward v. Churchward6 the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut forced a husband to repay his wife the sums spent for
the support of herself and their daughters although she had an
income of $100,000 a year from a business transferred to her by her
husband. Repayment could have been avoided only upon a showing
3. "The statutes which have endowed married women with the power to
have separate property, and to hold it as if they were unmarried, have not
dissolved the marriage, or abolished the peculiar incidents of the marital rela-
tion. The duty of providing maintenance and support for the family still
devolves on the husband .. ." Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N.J.L. 454, 459-60 (Sup.
Ct. 1879).
4. Let me point out to the militant feminists that the sentence contains the
word "almost." I agree that we still live in a man's world.
5. E.g., McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co. 137 Md. 573, 113 Atl. 107 (1921).
An early Vermont case to the contrary has not been followed. Hunt v.
Hayes, 64 Vt. 89, 23 Atl. 920 (1892). The cases are collected in Annot., 18
A.L.R. 1131 (1922). As to earnings the following 1955 statement from Pennsyl-
vania is typical: 'Moreover the fact that the wife. . . is receiving benefits from
the school district at the annual rate of $2,700 does not deprive her of the right
to look to her husband for support. A wife is entitled to support from her
husband even though she has earning capacity." Davidoff v. Davidoff, 178 Pa.
Super. 549, 552, 115 A.2d 892, 894 (1955).
6. 132 Conn. 72, 42 A.2d 659 (1945).
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that the husband's transfer had been made for the purpose of provid-
ing the wife with reasonable support. Recently in Maryland a man
was convicted for the crime of willfully neglecting to provide for
the support of his wife although she was possessed of $10,000 in cash.
7
A husband is liable in spite of the fact that someone else is providing
for his wife.
8
If a husband takes a wife's money to pay household bills or, in-
deed, to provide for her support he has a duty to repay it. 9 Of course,
a woman may voluntarily spend her own money to support herself
or the household and should she do so she may not get back what
she has spent.10
The stern demands upon the male are made clear by considering
Bahlman v. Bahlman,11 a case by no means unusual. Mr. Charles
Bahlman had been ordered by a decree of separate maintenance to pay
his wife, Nina, $75.00 per month out of a net income of $216.00 per
month. His mother required financial aid to the amount of $40.00
to $50.00 per month as well. Mr. Bahlman's petition for modification
of the decree was denied:
That the wife works, instead of remaining idle, or that her parents
furnish her shelter, does not relieve the husband under the facts of this
case. The primary obligation is on him.12
Our legal institutions give reality to the image of the respective
roles of the marriage partners not only by casting the husband in the
breadwinner's part but also by giving the wife only the smallest eco-
nomic bit. Save in a few states by statute a husband has no claim
upon his wife for support. The statutes which do speak of a wife's
duty to assist her husband financially are of three types: (1) those
that provide that husband and wife contract toward each other-
obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support; (2) those which
provide that the wife shall support her husband if he is unable be-
cause of infirmity to do so; and, (3) those which require a wife to
7. Ewell v. State, 114 A.2d 66 (Md. 1955).
8. E.g., Ex parte Hyatt, 254 Ala. 359, 48 So. 2d 329 (1950), in which the
court held that a husband's primary liability to support was not changed
by the fact that the wife's parents furnished her shelter and support. See
also Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924), which permitted a
father to recover from his daughter's husband for support given during a
period in which the daughter lived at home secretly married to the de-
fendant.
In Floyd v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950), a husband was not
permitted to recover from the estate of an insane wife sums spent on her
medical and hospital care even though she had recovered the amount
involved from a tortfeasor. The result in this case has been changed by
statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
9. Young v. Valentine, 177 N.Y. 347, 69 N.E. 643 (1904); Taylor v. Taylor,
54 Ore. 560, 103 Pac. 524 (1909).
10. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray, 278 N.Y. 380, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1938);
the cases are collected in Annot., 101 A.L.R. 442 (1936).
11. 218 Ala. 519, 119 So. 210 (1928).
12. Id. at 520, 119 So. at 211.
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support a husband who is likely to become a public charge. Ap-
parently statutes of the first type set forth a moral duty only, but
statutes in the second and third categories have been sometimes in-
voked as a basis for an award to the husband.13 In spite of the brave
words of the North Dakota Supreme Court as it imposed financial
responsibility for an ailing husband upon a wealthy wife, ..... no
good reason exists in these days of equality of husband and wife to
grant the wife a remedy and withhold the same from the other party
to the marriage relation,"'14 the creation of a duty in the wife only
when disaster strikes the husband falls a good deal short of treating
the sexes equally.
A number of states have enacted so-called family expense statutes.10
These statutes, varying somewhat in their formula, in general place
liability on the wife16 or her estate17 in respect to third persons for
items which are used for maintaining the family unit. As between
husband and wife, however, the statutes have not operated to shift
the liability for support nor to apportion the burden between the
spouses.' 8
The law enforces the ideal by insisting that the obligation of main-
tenance must exist if the marriage relationship exists in spite of the
parties' attempt to cut off or shift the obligation by private contract
between themselves. 19 An antenuptial agreement barring a woman's
support rights after marriage is void as against public policy even
if both parties understood that the marriage was solely for the pur-
pose of legitimatizing a child.20
13. Livingston v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 633, 49 Pac. 836 (1897); Hagert
v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W. 1035 (1911). See also, McLean v. McLean,
69 N.D. 665, 290 N.W. 913 (1940). Section 3 of the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act of 1954 provides that a wife has the duty to support her husband
"when in need." 9 U.L.A. 51 (Cum. Supp. 1955). The statutes are collected in
3 VERNIER, AIacEPIAN FAMILY LAW § 161 (1935).
14. Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 302, 133 N.W. 1035, 1040 (1911).
15. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 171 (Deering 1949) ILL REV. STAT. C. 68, § 15
(1953); IOWA CODE § 597.14 (1954); MINN. STAT. AWN. § 519.05 (1947).
16. Hayden v. Rogers, 22 IIl. App. 557 (1887).
17. Dreamer v. Oberlander, 122 Neb. 335, 240 N.W. 435 (1932), 18 VA.
L. REv. 680.
18. In Taylor v. Taylor, 54 Ore. 560, 103 Pac. 524 (1909), a wife asked
recovery from her husband for rent received from a building which she owned,
The defendant sought to show that he had spent the money for the family's
benefit. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the family expense statute
did not shift the burden of support between husband and wife. The effort of
the act was confined to giving creditors a right to sue either husband or wife
for family expenses. The court explained the matter: "Assume A and B were
partners, and A purchases from C goods for which as between the partners
A is under obligation to furnish, and A settles with C out of individual
funds in his hands belonging to B. Could it legally be held that, because it
happened to be an instance where C could hold the partnership for the goods
purchased, A would not have to account to B? Certainly not. So it is here." 54
Ore. at 583, 103 Pac. at 532. See, however, Truax v. Ellett, 234 Iowa 1217, 15
N.W.2d 36 (1944).
19. Note, Contractual Liquidations of the Husband's Duty to Support His
Wife, 40 COLum. L. REv. 677 (1940).
20. French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935).
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The moment the marriage relation comes into existence certain rights
and duties necessarily incident to that relation spring into being. One
of these duties is the obligation imposed by law upon the husband to
support his wife.21
Not only may the wife obtain a support order after an attempt
to cut off maintenance rights by contract but also a husband may
be guilty of a non-support crime in spite of assurance that his mar-
riage to give the bride's child a name would not carry with it an
obligation to support the wife.22
A wife's promise to provide support for the family is unenforce-
able.2 3 So also is an agreement by a wife to pay her husband a cer-
tain sum each month, in part because the husband, having the duty
of support, would always be able to call upon his wife to help him
to the extent of the promised payments. 24 It is only if the husband
contracts with third persons, for example, the brothers of his wife,
that he can transfer his burden to someone else.25
A husband's promise of maintenance does not constitute considera-
tion for a wife's promise to devise property to him. In re Ryan's
Estate26 tells of a marriage between a woman who was blind and in
need of care and the man who married her in reliance upon a con-
tract that she would leave her property to him in return for his
assistance and support. The husband had promised only what the
law requires: to provide support "that society be thus protected...
from the burden of supporting those of its members who are not
ordinarily expected to be wage earners."'2 7 Nor can a wife recover
for services rendered to a helpless husband under a verbal promise
that he would leave her the homestead. Performance of wifely serv-
ices is expected as a part of normal married life.2
Because the duty of support is placed upon a husband by the legal
relationship-the status of marriage rather than by a contract promise,
infancy29 or insanity3° does not relieve him of the obligation. Further-
more, the duty remains though the husband is indigent 3 ' or languishing
in jail.
32
Unless the wife has forfeited her right by misconduct a husband
must continue to respond while the marriage exists all during his
21. Id. at 546, 195 N.E. at 716.
22. State v. Ransell, 41 Conn. 433 (1874).
23. Corcoran v. Corcoran, 119 Ind. 138, 21 N.E. 468 (1889).
24. Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
25. Kovler v. Vagenheim, 130 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955).
26. 134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820 (1908).
27. Id. at 434, 114 N.W. at 821.
28. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
29. E.g., State v. McPherson, 72 Wash. 371, 130 Pac. 481 (1913).
30. Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 182, 141 N.E. 875, 877 (1924) (dictum).
31. E.g., Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Allen, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 585 (1863).
32. Ahern v. Easterby, 42 Conn. 546 (1875); Moran v. Montz, 175 Mo. App.
360, 162 S.W. 323 (1914).
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life or hers whichever is shorter. There is no statute of limitations
on the right to claim support.3 If a wife attempts to force payment
through an equity proceeding the defense of laches is available
but husbands have had great difficulty in establishing that they have
been prejudiced by not being called upon for support over a period
of time.34 Only the divorce courts qualify the undertaking "till
death us do part."35
It is commonly said that a wife is entitled to a level of maintenance
which is appropriate to her husband's wealth, income and station
in life.
Where parties are man and wife, it is obvious that they normally are
expected to live together. That does not mean that she is to sleep in
the garage, eat with the cook, and wear cast-offs. It commonly con-
templates not only sharing the same residence, but eating at the same
table, enjoying the ministrations of the same servants-if they have
servants-and wearing such apparel as befits the husband's station.30
The couple are to share the ups and downs of economic life.
The New York Court of Appeals has put it:
33. E.g., Reach v. Reach, 249 Ala. 102, 29 So. 2d 676 (1947) (20 years);
Thomas v. Thomas, 211 Ala. 504, 100 So. 766 (1924) (support given after ten
years); Rovner v. Rovner, 177 Pa. Super. 122, 111 A.2d 160 (1955) (support
order given after 13 years).
34. "[T]here is nothing in the finding to indicate that the delay prejudiced
the defendant. We cannot say as a matter of law that the court was com-
pelled on the facts to conclude that the plaintiff had lost her rights against
the defendant by laches." Kurzatkowski v. Kurzatkowski, 116 A.2d 906, 908
(Conn. 1955) (plaintiff made no claim on her husband for twenty-five
years).
In Gold v. Gold, 191 Md. 533, 62 A.2d 540 (1948), a twenty-five year delay
was a factor which contributed to the plaintiff's inability to prove who bore
the fault for separation. Time destroys witnesses if not liability.
35. After divorce the duty to support may be replaced by the duty to pay
alimony. In some states, by statute, payments in the nature of alimony may
be 'ordered after an annulment. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7341 (1949); IowA
CODE: § 598.24 (1954); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1955).
In every state in which insanity is a ground for divorce, appropriate special
protection is provided for the wife's support. See the opinion in Klinker
v. Klinker, 283 P.2d 83 (Cal. App. 1955).
A husband is liable to support a spouse joined to him by a voidable mar-
riage until the marriage has been annulled. State v. McPherson, 72 Wash.
371, 130 Pac. 481 (1913).
The duty of a husband to support ends at his death. Thereafter, a wife
must support herself by her own efforts or by means of the property to
which she is entitled under the laws of decedent's estate. In some states a
wife is entitled to a widow's support allowance out of the husband's estate.
E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 116.015 (1953). The right to such an allowance is
made to turn on a husband's duty to support his widow. See In re Coon's
Estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d 361, 237 P.2d 291 (1952); In re Aamoth, 197 ORE.
267. 253 P.2d 269 (1953).
Giving as a reason that the support duty ends at the husband's death, the
New Jersey Superior Court has held that he cannot be ordered, in a support
proceeding, to pay premiums on insurance policies on his life which were given
to his wife. Modell v. Modell, 23 N.J. Super. 60, 92 A.2d 505 (App. Div. 1952).
It should be noted that a husband is liable for his wife's funeral expenses.
MADDEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 61 (1931).
36. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 103 A.2d 234, 238 (Del. 1954).
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Marriage is frequently referred to as a contract entered into by the
parties, but it is more than a contract; it is a relationship established
according to law, with certain duties and responsibilities arising out of
it which the law itself imposes. The marriage establishes a status which
it is the policy of the State to maintain. Out of this relationship, and
not by reason of any terms of the marriage contract, the duty rests upon
the husband to support his wife and his family, not merely to keep them
from the poorhouse, but to support them in accordance with his station
and position in life. This works both ways. When he is prosperous, they
prosper; when financial misfortune befalls him, the wife and the family
are also obliged to receive less. 37
A contract between unseparated spouses calling for the payment
of a fixed sum to the wife each year is invalid because it interferes
with a desired flexibility in family economic affairs.3 A wife has
been given a level of support appropriate to her husband's means im-
mediately upon the marriage even though prior to the marriage she
earned only $180.00 monthly and he was a man of considerable
wealth.39
As long as the couple live together the husband may set the scale
of living40 although failure to provide a reasonable level of support
may be valid reason for a wife to leave her husband. 41 A husband
may fix the place of the home in which he has the duty to support
his wife.42 She is entitled to support in another place only if the
37. Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 340, 18 N.E.2d 521, 522 (1939).
38. Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939). The agreement
in Garlock was made when the parties were getting on well. But see Adams
v. Adams, 17 N.J. Misc. 234, 8 A.2d 214 (Ch. 1939), in which a contract calling
for $100.00 weekly to the wife was enforced. The parties were in some marital
trouble. The wife agreed to take the husband back if he would make a
weekly cash payment. This case seems to have upheld a reunion agreement
rather than a separation agreement. See also, Terkelsen v. Peterson, 216
Mass. 531, 104 N.E. 351 (1914).
39. Hempel v. Hempel, 225 Minn. 287, 30 N.W.2d 594 (1948) (the wife,
a divorcee, was awarded $750.00 monthly). Cf. Coe v. Coe, 313 Mass. 232,
46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943). There the court, in setting the wife's support award at
only $35.00 per week although the husband was wealthy, pointed to the
following facts: (a) the wife had been a salesgirl before marriage; (b) she
had not helped him to create his wealth; (c) she had not shared in it during
marriage because of his frugal habits.
40. "[A] wide latitude of discretion must be allowed him as to how much
of his income it is advisable to spend and how much should be retained
for the purpose of establishing a competence for the future. Furthermore,
he is entitled to a large extent to dictate the manner in which such money
shall be spent." Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N.J. Eq. 715, 717, 120 Atl. 790, 791
(Ch. 1923).
41. "A court of equity as a rule will not undertake to settle disputes as to the
exact amount a husband should pay his wife for the support of herself and
the maintenance of the home, but when, as in this case, there is a great
discrepancy between the husband's very large income and the very small
and insufficient amount he is willing to pay her for her maintenance and
support, the court is justified in finding that the acts of the husband con-
stitute non-support and extreme cruelty." Miller v. Miller, 320 Mich. 43,
48-49, 30 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1948). In the Miller case the wife had not
separated from her home. The husband, at the time of the suit slept in
a different room, failed to take meals with her and did not speak.
42. E.g., Boyett v. Boyett, 152 Miss. 201, 119 So. 299 (1928).
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home is egregiously unfit or dominated by in-laws.43
We can emphasize the argument that when a wife deprives her
husband of the benefit of living with her and of the contribution of
her wifely services, he need no longer reciprocate with support or
we can underscore the fact that in a statement of the ideal a wife who
runs away is not deserving of the care, protection and support of
her husband. For either reason a wife who abandons her husband
is not entitled to support and, as we should expect, a husband who
runs away without just cause carries his duty to support with him.
When husband and wife live apart without mutual consent, the duty
of the husband to support turns upon a question of fault.44 The wife
forfeits her right to support if she leaves for an inadequate reason
or if she give her husband just cause for leaving. A husband must
continue to contribute if he abandons her wrongfully or if he, by
his misconduct, drives her from the home.
Adequate reasons for living apart are not everywhere the same.
Clearly if one party gives the other a cause for divorce the injured
party may leave home with justification. In some states if no ground
for divorce has been given, that ends the matter. In those states a
wife who leaves her husband is entitled to support only if his con-
duct provides a ground for divorce and he may not rightly leave her
unless she has given grounds.45
In other states, where a wife may expect separate support follow-
ing misconduct toward her that is less serious than a ground for
divorce, the facts to be shown have been described by various
formulae. Cruel and abusive treatment is generally a sufficient reason
for the injured party to leave even in states where divorces are not
given for such an offense.46 The rules may have their source in the
case law of equity jurisprudence 47 or specific legislative enactments.
In either event the rules may be quite vaguely phrased. The Illinois
Separate Maintenance Act does no more than declare, by legislation,
an equitable remedy which might exist irrespective of the act:
43. E.g., State v. Bagwell, 125 S.C. 401, 118 S.E. 767 (1923). It has been
held that refusing to live at the home of the husband's parents when there is
no economic necessity to do so is a "reason adequate in law" for separation
under the Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth v. Di Pietro, 175 Pa. Super.
18, 102 A.2d 192 (1954). Generally a wife's refusal to live with in-laws
must be justified by past experience. State v. Allderige, 124 Conn. 377, 200
Atl. 341 (1938). Cases involving in-laws are collected in Annots., 38 A.L.R.
338 (1925), 47 A.L.R. 687 (1927).
44. The issue of fault is present in every support case. A concise treat-
ment of the rules is found in Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704
(1921). Many cases dealing with the issue are collected in Annot., 6 A.L.R. 6
(1920).
45. E.g., Price v. Price, 281 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. App. 1955); Irvin v. Irvin,
88 N.J. Eq. 139, 102 Atl. 440 (1917), aff'd, 88 N.J. Eq. 596, 103 Atl. 1052 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1918).
46. E.g., Turgeon v. Turgeon, 329 Mass. 364, 108 N.E.2d 532 (1952) (cruel
treatment not a ground for divorce but a reason for separate support.)
47. E.g., Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951).
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Married men or women who, without their fault, now live or hereafter
may live separate and apart from their wives or husbands may have their
remedy in equity, in their own names, respectively, against their said
wives or husbands in the Circuit Court of the county where the wife
or the husband resides, for a reasonable support and maintenance while
they so live or have so lived separate and apart.48
In Pennsylvania she may depart for a "reason adequate in law"; 49
in Connecticut for "any improper conduct upon the part of the hus-
band, which would defeat the purpose of the marriage relation."50
South Carolina has put it quaintly by permitting a wife to leave if
the husband:
.. . practices such obscene and revolting indecencies in the family
circle, and so outrages all the sentiments of delicacy and refinement
characteristic to the sex, that a modest and pure-minded woman would
find these grievances more dreadful and intolerable to be borne than
most cruel inflictions upon her person.51
These imprecise rules require the courts to distinguish between
fault and legally inoperative matters such as normal quarreling,
52
falling out of love 53 and bad housekeeping5 4
Both parties to a marriage should realize that living conditions can
seldom be continuously perfect and that each is called upon to tolerate
such inconveniences and annoyances and make such sacrifices for the
common welfare as necessity imposes or circumstances reasonably re-
quire.55
Fault, once identified in a marriage partner will relieve the other
spouse of his obligation of support or her duty of cohabitation. If
the fault is the wife's she may demand no further maintenance, if
the husband's he must contribute though his wife leaves. If the
parties are equally at fault the wife has no right of support and
no duty to cohabit with her husband.56
The blame for a separation can shift upon an offer to return home.57
48. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 68, § 22 (1955). Other statutes contain similar pro-
visions; e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 46-2-1(3) (1953) (any ground generally
recognized in equity); FLA. STAT. AwN. § 65.10 (1943) (liability to wife
living apart "through his fault"); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-210 (1952) (wife
"abandoned or driven off by her husband").
49. Commonwealth v. Pinkenson, 162 Pa. Super. 227, 57 A.2d 720 (1948),
contains frequently cited language summarizing the Pennsylvania rules.
50. State v. Newman, 91 Conn. 6, 9, 98 Atl. 346, 347 (1916).
51. Wise v. Wise, 60 S.C. 426, 447, 38 S.E. 794, 805 (1901).
52. E.g., Carey v. Carey, 8 App. D.C. 528 (1896).
53. Boyett v. Boyett, 152 Miss. 201, 119 So. 299 (1928).
54. State v. Kelley, 100 Conn. 727, 125 Atl. 95 (1924).
55. State v. Allderige, 124 Conn. 377, 381, 200 Atl. 341, 343 (1938).
56. E.g., Zichterman v. Zichterman, 308 Mich. 76, 13 N.W.2d 213 (1944);
Obermire v. Obermire, 232 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. App. 1950); Ivanhoe v. Ivanhoe,
68 Ore. 297, 136 Pac. 21 (1913). But cf. Mattson v. Mattson, 181 Cal. 44, 183
Pac. 443 (1919).
57. Kurzatowski v. Kurzatowski, 116 A.2d 906 (Conn. 1955); Barefoot v.
Barefoot, 83 N.J. Eq. 685, 93 AtL 192 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914); Zinno v. Zinno, 106
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A wife who has abandoned her husband without just cause is en-
titled to be received in his home if she makes a request in good faith
that she be permitted to return. His failure to take her in puts the
fault on his shoulders. So also a run-away husband can destroy the
wife's right to separate support by a bona fide offer to return. These
effects of an offer to resume living together do not operate if the
reason for the separation was the offerors's serious misconduct other
than the desertion and no evidence is presented that offeror has
changed his ways.58 Obviously offers to return are often made with-
out sincerity as a part of the strategy of marital warfare.59
The fault for which a woman may lose her right to maintenance
must have occurred after the marriage. In some states the conceal-
ment of wrongdoing may be a ground for annulment on a theory of
fraud but if the marriage is not voidable a woman of defective
character or easy virtue before marriage is as much a wife and as
fully protected by the law as the most virtuous of her sisters. As
the Delaware court recently said in this connection:
All we mean here to assert is the basic principle that support to the
wife, so long as she remains the wife, must be as the wife, not as some
creature of inferior standing. Ours is not one of those civilizations which
recognizes degrees of wifehood.60
The conduct cf the parties after separation can have importance.
It has been held that a wife who leaves her husband for cause loses
her right to support by her adulterous conduct 6' and contrariwise a
wife has been able to claim support from a husband who has taken
a mistress although, in the beginning, the wife had left wrongfully.62
John and Alice can kiss and make up. If the party at fault is
forgiven by the innocent party the support rights and duties revert
to normal. The possibility that a cause for cutting off support may
be condoned has been given as a reason for barring a husband's re-
coupment from his wife for support money supplied her but spent
for the benefit of her lover.63 At the time of making the payments
the husband did not know of his wife's infidelity. A wife who took
her husband back for ten days after he had been' arrested for carry-
ing on with a mistress lost her right to separate maintenance.
6 4
A.2d 256 (R. I. 1954). Cases on the effect of an offer to return are collected in
Annot., 6 A.L.R. 6, 46 (1920).
58. Kurzatowski v. Kurzatowski, 116 A.2d 906 (Conn. 1955).
59. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 316 Ill. 204, 147 N.E. 110 (1925).
60. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 103 A.2d 234, 238 (Del. 1954). See also, State v.
Hill, 161 Iowa 279, 142 N.W. 231 (1913) (lack of chastity before marriage
does not destroy wife's right to support).
61. Webster v. Boyle-Pryor Const. Co., 144 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. App. 1940)
M. Martin Polokow Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 336 Ill. 395, 168 N.E. 27i
(1929).
62. Commonwealth v. Cartmell, 164 Pa. Super. 261, 63 A.2d 691 (1949).
63. Hobbs v. Hobbs, 201 Ga. 791, 41 S.E.2d 428 (1947).
64. Williams v. Williams, 188 Va. 543, 50 S.E.2d 277 (1948). It has been
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By the law of most states the couple may liVe apart by mutual
consent without changing support rights and duties. 65 A few states
cut off a husband's responsibility should the partners live separately
by agreement,66 while in others the amount which he must supply
is reduced by whatever income the wife has from her separate
estate.67 A small number of cases, emphasizing that a husband's duty
to support depends on the wife's services to him, have held that a
husband need not support a wife committed by operation of law
to a public institution.68 Most cases are to the contrary, reflecting,
it seems to me, what most people think to be proper affection and
obligation between married persons.
69
The Reality
In the preceding pages we have seen some of the principal doctrines
respecting a husband's duty to support his wife, a duty which, I
believe, reflects a conception of how an ideal married couple would
share their lives. The rules of support mirror the norms of married
life. This points up a source of trouble. Almost none of the actual
litigation raising questions of support duties involve couples living
together in the ordinary way.
In fact, a wife living with her husband has no effective legal remedy
to enforce a money payment to make her husband provide more
adequately.
It would be difficult to devise a stronger case for judicial intervention
than Nebraska's McGuire v. McGuire.70 Mrs. McGuire, living with
her husband, brought a suit in equity against him. At the trial she
established the most astonishing niggardliness -on the part of her
husband, described by the court as a person of "more than ordinary
frugality." She was a dutiful, hard-working wife who had been
given almost no money for her own use in thirty-three years of mar-
held that a reconciliation as such will not terminate an order for separate
support. Termination will take place only if the parties intend a termination
or the resumption of marital relations under circumstances showing a "bona
fide reconciliation had in fact occurred." Justice v. Justice, 108 N.E.2d 874, 876
(Ohio C.P. 1952). A contrary rule would discourage reconciliation attempts
and give hope to a scheming spouse.
65. E.g., Munger v. Munger, 21 N.J. Super. 49, 90 A.2d 539 (1952); Common-
wealth v. Myerson, 160 Pa. Super. 432, 51 A.2d 350 (1947).
66. E.g., Jenny v. Jenny, 178 Cal. 604, 174 Pac. 652 (1918).
67. E.g., Benjamin v. Benjamin, 283 App. Div. 455, 128 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st
Dep't 1954).
68. The leading case is Richardson v. Stuesser, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N.W. 261
(1905).
69. E.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Thrasher, 105 Cal. App. 2d 768,
234 P.2d 230 (1951); Snyder v. Lane, 135 W. Va. 887, 65 S.E.2d 483 (1951).
The defendant husband in the Lane case succeeded in relieving himself of
liability later by proving that his wife, while still lucid, had abandoned
him. Snyder v. Lane, 89 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1955). Collections of cases are
found in Aurora Casket Co. v. Ropers, 117 Ind. App. 684, 75 N.E.2d 680 (1947),
and in the dissenting opinion in Warren v. Boney, 52 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 1951).
70. 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953).
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riage. Mr. McGuire, age 80, was worth about $200,000 in 1953 but
permitted himself only the extravagance of operating two automobiles,
a 1927 Chevrolet pickup truck and a 1929 Ford coupe equipped with
a defective heater. Mr. McGuire lived in a run down house not pro-
vided with a bathroom or bathing facilities and satisfied himself
with an old-fashioned kitchen without a kitchen sink. The trial court
judge was so moved by Mrs. McGuire's story that he entered an
order of extraordinary particularity. Among other items the husband
was to provide her $50.00 per month, to pay for certain items in the
nature of improvements and repairs, furniture and household appli-
ances, and to buy a new automobile with an efficient heater within
30 days. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed both as to the
monthly payments as well as to the specific items.
The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the house-
hold, and not for the courts to determine, even though the husband's at-
titude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves
little to be said in his behalf. As long as the home is maintained and the
parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband
is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage relation is
being carried out.71
Most legal questions of support are raised in respect to marriages
that are, in fact, broken (at least for a time). The legal relationship
persists while the parties have separated and either (1) they are
engaged in litigation between themselves; or (2) a third person is
trying to collect from the husband for supplying the separated wife;
or (3) the state is prosecuting a criminal action for non-support.
In most cases the fundamental bases of close personal relations have
already been destroyed; only the legal shell remains. The rules taken
from the ideal of normal married life are applied to human relation-
ships that have disintegrated.
71. Id. at 238, 59 N.W.2d at 342. The plaintiff in Commonwealth v. George,
358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948), contended that her husband controlled the
spending of money too strictly. A support order was denied. "The arm of
the court is not empowered to reach into the home and to determine the
manner in which the earnings of a husband shall be expended where he has
neither deserted his wife without cause nor neglected to support her and
their children." Id. at 123, 56 A.2d at 231.
In State v. Clark, 234 N.C. 192, 66 S.E.2d 669 (1951), the accused success-
fully defended against a criminal charge of neglect to support his wife
while they were living together. The defendant's failure to provide spend-
ing money and maternity dresses was not sufficient to constitute the "wilifull
neglect" required under the North Carolina criminal non-support statute. Cf.
Miller v. Miller, 320 Mich. 43, 30 N.W.2d 509 (1948), in which the wife was
given $300.00 to support herself and the family, including a niggardly
husband. His lack of generosity was one ground for the decree of separate
maintenance. The husband was still physically present in the house but
slept in his own room, ate meals outside the home, and did not speak to
his wife. The Miller case is typical of many on the question whether
physical separation of the parties is required before a support decree will
be entered.
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Except for the legal consequences, a long and hostile separation
is in most important respects, much like a divorce. Rules based on
thinking about a normal marriage should be bent to take account of
the facts of marital disorganization. Some of the results do, in fact,
reflect the reality.
As we have seen, antenuptial contracts cutting off a woman's right
to support and contracts made during a marriage fixing a sum to be
paid for support are invalid and unenforceable. However, when
separation is in view, an agreement fixing a wife's support claim is
generally enforceable, provided its terms are fairly reasonable. In
most states an adequate property settlement may be the basis for cut-
ting off further periodic payments completely. Not only is a fair
separation agreement calling for periodic payments enforceable, but
it has been held that a wife's claim may never exceed the sum agreed
upon.72 It is better for the separated parties to settle their problems
by contract once and for all than to battle unceasingly in the law
court.
73
Nevertheless, useful contractual accommodations between separated
parties are still sometimes upset because a court has applied rules ap-
propriate to the ideals of married life. In Haas v. Haas74 a husband
agreed to pay $100.00 per week under a separation agreement which
provided, as well, that payment would be suspended if the wife should-
engage in business competition with the husband. The court held that
a husband could not so relieve himself of the duty to support his
wife-a duty imposed by the nature of the relationship and not
terminable by contractual arrangement. Yet the agreement, accept-
able to the wife in the beginning, had provided the basis for economic
settlement in a distressing marital separation. The agreement may.
have prevented the bitterest warfare. It is hard to see what objective
is advanced by the Haas decision save to make peacemaking contracts
more difficult between parties to a marriage.
The amount to which the wife is entitled has often been described.
in terms of an unrealistic standard, if we realize that in most sup-.
port litigation we are confronted, by and large, with persons who are
divorced in all but name. It is all very well to speak of Alice's right
to support according to John's station in life but, except for the very
rich, that standard is impossibly high. One of the least publicized
aspects of divorce is the economic catastrophe which it brings. Sep-
arate support brings the same disaster. In rejecting the notion that
a separated wife is entitled to exactly the same style of life as her
husband the Supreme Court of Delaware has recently said: "Any
72. Cases are collected in Annot., 6 A.L.R. 6, 75 (1920).
73. A useful commentary is Note, Contractual Liquidations of the Husband's
Duty to Support His Wife, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 677 (1940).
74. 298 N.Y. 69, 80 N.E.2d 337 (1948).
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such absurd general holding on our part would constantly fly in the
face of the fundamentals of economics .... 75
A standard which seeks to keep the parties in the same economic
pattern cannot be met. A moment's reflection will reveal two apart
cannot be maintained as cheaply as two together. Further, such a
standard obscures the task which confronts courts which seek to con-
struct the proper financial arrangement in cases of marital failure.
The job is exceedingly difficult and the judges should be permitted to
consider a wide range of factors.
Yet statements such as the following are still repeated in the re-
ports: "She is entitled to be maintained on the same basis mutually
agreed upon by the parties and found satisfactory before family
troubles put in an appearance."7 6 Certainly the style of living adopted
by the parties is a factor which the courts will take into account.
Further, the pre-separation rate of expenditure may act as a ceiling
on the amount of the order. In Coe v. Coe,7 7 Mrs. Coe had to remain
content with $35.00 weekly because, although her husband was
wealthy and could have spent lavishly, he did not do so.
Generally the formulations of a separated wife's standard of
support do not aim so clearly at retaining her pre-separation economic
position. Some opinions tell of trial judges who neither look back-
ward to the style of the parties' former life not dig very deeply into
circumstances of the present, but rather employ as the basis for an
award a certain fixed portion of the husband's income. One-third
or one-fourth are favorite fractions for this purpose. 8 The appellate
courts have generally disapproved of the mechanical division of
income in favor of a less rigid approach to the problem. "The matter
of the allowance and the amount, however, are within the sound dis-
cretion of the court, depending on the circumstances, one of which
would be whether the wife is without means. ' 79 The Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut has said that a husband must "provide for
her within the reasonable limits of his ability, and what is reasonable
must be determined ... after a full disclosure of his financial condi-
tion and his and her station in life."80 In 1954 the Maryland Supreme
Court said: "In determining an award of alimony or support, the
court has no precise rule or standard formula .... The ability of the
husband to provide support and the wife's need for it are controlling
75. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 103 A.2d 234, 238 (Del. 1954).
76. Adams v. Adams, 17 N.J. Misc. 234, 242, 8 A.2d 214, 219 (Ch. 1939).
77. 313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943).
78. E.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 211 Ala. 504, 100 So. 766 (1924) (one-fourth).
One-third of a husband's income has been a common measure of support for
a wife alone. This automatic division is criticized in a thoughtful New
Jersey opinion: O'Neill v. O'Neill, 18 N.J. Misc. 82, 11 A.2d 128 (Ch. 1939).
79. Rowe v. Rowe, 256 Ala. 491, 493, 55 So. 2d 749, 750 (1951).
80. Smith v. Smith, 114 Conn. 575, 581, 159 Atl. 489, 491 (1932).
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factors."81 The Alabama Supreme Court has said that support should
be "adequate and proper, taking into consideration his income."82
Other statements recognize that judges ought to have the freedom
to consult a wide range of factors in fixing the extent of a husband's
duty.8 3 Typical is this excerpt from a recent Massachusetts opinion:
A wife living apart from her husband for justifiable cause is entitled to
an allowance for her support . . .which is fair and reasonable, having
in mind the station in life of the parties, their financial means, their needs
and necessities, and all other factors which ought to be considered in
determining what the husband should pay in satisfying an obligation
which the law places upon him.84
Among the "other factors" should surely be the circumstances leading
up to the separation. Some courts have suggested that equal treat-
ment with her husband is the limit of the wife's expectation. "[S]he
is entitled to no better support from him than he can provide for
himself."85
The legislation, in those states which so provide for support orders
or separate maintenance, generally makes no reference at all to the
81. Brown v. Brown, 204 Md. 197, 103 A.2d 856, 861 (1954).
82. Cairnes v. Cairnes, 211 Ala. 342, 343, 100 So. 317 (1924). See also Rowe v.
Rowe, supra note 79, 55 So. 2d at 750.
83. "Former Advisory Master Herr, in his work Marriage, Divorce and
Separation (2d ed.1950) (10 New Jersey Practice), § 430, pp. 421-430, has
comprehensively enumerated some of the factors which have been con-
sidered by courts in fixing the amount of support to be paid by the husband,
without suggesting that other elements might not be taken into account
in certain cases. Some of these factors are: (1) the interest of the State,
society, and the community where the wife resides; (2) the wife should not
be enriched nor the husband penalized; (3) the husband's property, and
income-and here the court may also consider his capacity to earn money
through personal attention to his business; (4) the bona fide indebtedness
of the husband; (5) the actual needs of the wife, although her wants are not
the sole criterion; (6) the wife's age, condition of health and ability to earn
support; (7) her separate property and income; (8) the sum she would have
a right to expect had she and her husband continued to live together; (9) in-
come tax; (10) the amount should be so limited as not to render separation
attractive to the wife, and yet not so meagre as to make cohabitation a
necessity." Turi v. Turi, 34 N.J. Super. 313, 112 A.2d 278, 283 (App. Div.
1955). See also, § 6 of the Uniform Civil Liability Act, 9 U.L.A. 51 (Cum. Supp.
1955): "When determining the amount due for support the court shall con-
sider all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others."
84. White v. White, 329 Mass. 768, 109 N.E.2d 646, (1952). See also, Coe v.
Coe, 313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 18 N.J. Misc.
82, 11 A.2d 128 (Ch. 1939).
85. Smith v. Smith, 50 R.I. 278, 146 Atl. 626, 627 (1929). Cf. "[Tihere is
nothing in the laws of God or man that requires a husband and father to
give up his all so as to deprive himself of a support or exhaust the corpus
of his estate to provide an income for his wife with whom he is not living




objective of keeping up the, former standard of life. Rather the
statutes direct the courts to enter an order appropriate in the light
of all the circumstances.
We have not come far toward solving a support problem merely
to say that we ought to consider all of the relevant factors. We
go further by considering some of the problems which recur in the
cases.
Obviously, one of the most important considerations is the ability
of the husband to pay. This factor has been regarded as more im-
portant than the parties' usual style of living in a case where the
style of living was far beyond the husband's means.86 In most cases
the husband's ability to earn places sharp limits upon the amount of
an award for support, and hence the award will be inadequate for
needs of the wife. Often there is so little after division that both
parties inevitably are in most tragic circumstances.87 There may,
however, be a division even of very little.88 In Jolcai v. Jokai,8 9
an unemployed strudel baker of advanced age received a support
order for $25.00 per month from an unemployed husband afflicted
with arthritis, defective eyesight and bad hearing, whose income
totaled about $70.00 per month. We can guess that in such cases
the Department of Welfare will soon have a lively interest. The hard
life that lies ahead for the litigants is brought home as well by
Morgan v. Morgan.90 Mr. Morgan was ordered to pay $29.00 per
week for the support of his wife, their child and her child by a
former marriage. He grossed about $68.00 per week with deductions
for (a) union dues $.50, (b) sick benefits $.52, (c) Social Security $.68,
(d) hospitalization $1.13 and (e) withholding $4.08. After taking
into account an additional $1.25 for insurance on a car used in his
business, Mr. Morgan had take-home pay of about $59.00 with which
to pay the order.
The husband's ability to pay will be determined by a consideration
of all his economic resources and potential. The extent of his property
will be a factor in setting a periodic award, although in separation
86. Jones v. Jones, 348 Pa. 411, 35 A.2d 270 (1944). "[T]he financial ability
of the defendant to provide the means of maintaining the wife and the chil-
dren in the way to which they are accustomed or which would be most
desirable, must, in the last analysis, control the award to be made by the
court." Hill v. Hill, 115 N.E.2d 399, 402 (Ohio App. 1953).
87. This unhappy observation has often been made in the New York courts
accompanied with a citation to Justice Panken's opinion in Domb v. Domb,
176 Misc. 409, 27 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
88. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, Everett v. Everett, 94
N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949), provides a good illustration of the
awful problem of trying to divide a husband's income between himself and
his wife and three children. The husband, a policeman earning a net wage
of $316.00 per month, was ordered to pay support of $160.00 monthly. The
economic reverse suffered because of the separation was undoubtedly fright-
ful for both parties.
89. 121 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Don. Rel. Ct. 1953).
90. 191 Misc. 53, 76 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948).
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cases courts are not ordinarily empowered to award the wife a
portion of his property. One resource which could be quite valuable,,
but which is not taken into account, is the wealth of the husband's
parents. The estimate of his means can properly include a fair
guess at an annual bonus,91 and in like manner earnings of a corpora-
tion owned and controlled by the husband.9 2 The power to earn not
presently realized may be a reason for a higher award than present
earnings would justify.93 Although a wise court will not require a
medical intern to cut short his training simply because, immediately,
he can earn more at another job,94 a husband may not defeat his re-
sponsibility by seeing to it that he is poorly paid.95 Repayment of a
husband's indebtedness will have to be fitted into a reasonable
scheme of family support.96 The Federal Income Tax will be taken
into account in estimating a husband's ability to pay, but one case
has held that the deductions from gross income for tax purposes do
not necessarily reduce a husband's income for purposes of determin-
ing the proper level of support.97
Clearly a wife's wages, ownership of property or capacity to earn
does not relieve a husband of all responsibility to provide for her
support.98 On the other hand, a wife's earnings have often been taken
into account in setting the amount provided by an order of support.99
It has also been suggested that if the couple live apart voluntarily
91. Commonwealth v. Bicking, 163 Pa. Super. 454, 62 A.2d 118 (1948).
92. Sack v. Sack, 328 Mass. 600, 105 N.E.2d 371 (1952).
93. E.g., Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 72 A.2d 318 (1950) ($14.00 per
week ordered out of $22.00 unemployment compensation income; court em-
phasized that the unemployment was probably only temporary.).
94. In Commonwealth v. Lazarou, 119 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1956), a trial
court had ordered a medical school graduate to pay $100.00 per month in
spite of his income of $75.00 per month as an intern. The trial judge had
noted that pharmaceutical manufacturers would be willing to pay over
$100.00 a week for his services. The appellate court's modification of the
award to $15.00 per month was made in the light of several considerations:
(a) the good faith of the young man's choice of a low paying job; (b) the
fact that his wife would have shared this low salary had she remained
married to him; and (c) support orders may be modified in the future. It was,
perhaps, also of importance that the wife was working as a school teacher
at $2,800.
95. See Commonwealth v. Wieczorkowski, 155 Pa. Super. 517, 38 A.2d 347
(1944). Kramer v. Kramer, 248 App. Div. 781, 289 N.Y. Supp. 49 (2d Dep't
1936), holds a dentist in contempt for failure to meet a support order. The
defendant had accepted non-professional employment at $1080.00 per year,
much less than he could have earned as a dentist. Adams v. Adams, 174 N.J.
Misc. 234, 8 A.2d 214 (Ch. 1939), holds that the amount of an award can be
calculated by taking into account income from a business which the husband
had conveyed to his brother for the purpose of defeating his wife's claim.
96. Nilsson v. Nilsson, 200 Misc. 841, 108 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1951); Commonwealth v. Homer, 178 Pa. Super. 411, 77 A.2d 641 (1951).
97. Commonwealth v. Rankin, 170 Pa. Super. 570, 87 A.2d 799 (1952).
98. E.g., Waldrop v. Waldrop, 222 Ala. 625, 134 So. 1 (1931) (wife's ability
to earn does not relieve 9, husband of the duty of maintenance.)
99. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Kaufman, 63 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1953); Spalding v.
Spalding, 280 App. Div. 836, 114 N.Y.S.2d 19 (2d Dep't 1952). Cf. Hensinger
v. Hensinger, 334 Mich. 344, 54 N.W.2d 610 (1952) (wife's earnings not a
ground for modification of separate maintenance decree.)
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the husband is responsible only if the wife has no means of her own. 100
In devising the best and most practical way to take care of the eco-
nomic problems of a broken home certainly a woman's means are
highly relevant. There is much to recommend the provision in an
order of a Massachusetts trial court: "As soon as the petitioner is
well and able to go to work, the petition for modification may be re-
opened, and if the petitioner is able to support herself, the twenty
dollar a week order is to be revoked."''1 1 A New Jersey court has
reminded us that apart from benefiting the husband, the wife's
employment ".... also benefits society. Self-support, whether of men
or women, is to be encouraged." 102
After a separation a husband loses much of his control over the
standard of living to be enjoyed by his wife.103 His ability to provide
becomes much more important than his willingness to do so. Within
wide limits a husband may set the pattern of expenditure while
the parties are living together. After separation the amount which
a husband voluntarily sends to his wife does not limit his liability for
her support. 04
All marriages need not be treated on the same basis. There is a
great deal of force in the dissenting judge's view in a recent Delaware
case that a wife was entitled to a smaller sum than would otherwise be
the case because "she married for money, without love, and by her
actions as a wife helped produce the ultimate separation after a child-
less marriage of a year and a half."'05 Some cases have taken into
100. "We think that the rule ought to be that where the wife has capital
funds which produce income after a separation by mutual consent, the
net amount of income left to her when taxes are paid ought to be credited
to the amount found to be due for necessaries. This is especially persuasive
in its force when the husband himself has furnished the capital to the
wife." Benjamin v. Benjamin, 283 App. Div. 455, 457, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 401, 403
(1st Dep't 1954). See also, Fredd v. Eves, 4 Har. 385, 387 (Del. 1846); St.
Mary's Hospital v. Paxton, 10 N.J. Misc. 514, 159 Atl. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
Decker & Bros. v. Moyer, 121 N.Y. Supp. 630 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
101. Perry v. Perry, 329 Mass. 771, 110 N.E.2d 498, 499 (1953).
102. Turi v. Turi, 34 N.J. Super. 313, 323, 112 A.2d 278, 284 (App. Div.
1955). Cf., the charge to the jury in a Georgia case of alimony after divorce
"[The jury was to consider] whether or not it is wise or unwise to give her
an amount which would enable her to lead a life of idleness or whether
under all the facts and circumstances it would better serve public policy to
require the wife to contribute something to her own support." Fried v. Fried,
208 Ga. 861, 862, 69 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1952). The instruction was held erroneous
because it put the question of public policy to the jury.
103. See Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N.J. Eq. 715, 120 Atl. 790 (Ch. 1923).
104. Smith v. Smith, 114 Conn. 575, 159 Atl. 489 (1932) (no defense to
support order that husband is sending his wife ten dollars a week); Miller
v. Miller, 241 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App. 1951) (husband's voluntary contribution
of $25.00 per week for wife and child supplanted order of $50.00 per week);
Gross v. Gross, 22 N.J. Super. 407, 92 A.2d 71 (App. Div. 1952) ($60.00 per
week supplied held insufficient). In a criminal non-support case such
voluntary payments would be evidence of the husband's lack of willfulness
in his neglect of duty.
105. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 103 A.2d 234, 244 (Del. 1954) (dissenting
opinion).
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account the fact that neither party "received quite what he bargained
for."'0 6 Age, health, duration of the marriage, and the lack of chil-
dren have been given importance in setting the level of support.
107
Conduct, of course, is a factor which the courts ought to and
do take into account in setting the amount of an award. As one court
has put it:
[I]t is most difficult to say who is at fault. The couple seems to have
been ill assorted in their marriage relations; and, in fixing the amount
of support which the wife is entitled to, a court always takes into con-
sideration the conduct of the wife, as well as that of the husband.108
The conduct of the parties is more than a factor to be taken into
account in setting the level of support. Whether any duty at all re-
mains with the husband to support a separated wife will depend
on her conduct. If the separation is his "fault" the duty to support
remains; if hers, the duty no longer exists. Imposing responsibility
for the broken emotional ties of marriage on an all or nothing basis
is easily done only by failing to make careful and dispassionate in-
quiry. Ordinarily it takes two to break a home. Both parties usually
bear some of the fault; both ought to bear some of the financial re-
sponsibility. In Leach v. Leach'0 9 the wife left home and the husband
sued for divorce. Mrs. Leach counterclaimed for divorce. Divorce
was denied both, but Mrs. Leach was given a support order of $300.00
per month. She charged that he gave too much attention to his busi-
ness, paid no attention to her, and failed to participate in a normal
social life. The trial court found that the "record abounds in proof
of trivialities" yet gave the award on the ground of her need caused
by poor health. The trial judge did not limit himself to an inquiry into
fault. "It is evident to the court that her physical and nervous con-
dition has had a great deal to do with the strained relationship which
has gradually arisen between the parties.""10 The Supreme Court
106. Everman v. Everman, 243 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1951). Here the parties,
age 57 and 67, were together about 17 months. Both had been previously mar-
ried and before the ceremony both had made "some misrepresentation ...
as to financial condition." The trial concluded that the wife was in some
degree at fault. A lump sum award of $200.00 was affirmed. See also, Com-
monwealth v. Weible, 159 Pa. Super. 290, 48 A.2d 161 (1946).
107. E.g., in Jokai v. Jokai, 121 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953),
the court took into account "the short duration of this marital relationship,
the fact that it was for each a third marriage, that there is no issue, the age
of the parties, the fact that respondent is not well . . . that before the
marriage the petitioner had supported herself and still has the ability to
work." Id. at 520. See also, Sugarman v. Sugarnan, 197 Md. 182, 78 A.2d 456
(1951).
A court may provide that the husband must pay extra-ordinary medical
expenses. Hill v. Hill, 115 N.E.2d 399 (Ohio App. 1953).
108. Symington v. Symington, 36 Atl. 21 (N.J. Ch. 1896). See also Chapman
v. Chapman, 13 Ind. 396 (1859) (conduct of the wife is a proper factor to
consider in setting the amount of support.)
109. 261 Wis. 350, 52 N.W.2d 896 (1952).
110. Id., 52 N.W.2d at 899.
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of Wisconsin reversed the award to the wife because she had left
home "without just cause." Her health was not an adequate reason
to give a support order because she had not been confined to bed and
had spent most of her evenings away from home playing cards with
friends. The Wisconsin Court's disposition of this case cannot be
sound. In theory she could attempt to return home to a husband
who had attempted to divorce her and resume a relationship already
productive of much emotional disturbance. In practice, she is not
likely to do so. Granting that the husband should not be forced
to support her for the r~st of her days, most persons will still feel
she is deserving of some financial help for a time."
To permit the duty of support to stand or fall on the issue of fault
is to introduce undesirable rigidity in the disposition of separate sup-
port problems. Determination of fault by mechanical tests can make
the rigidity ludicrous. Two examples can show how unsatisfactory is
a rigid approach 'to these problems. As we have seen, fault even
shifts with the latest offer to return. In a nineteenth century case
from Illinois the blame for a separation remained on a wife who
had 'wrongfully left her husband although she had offered to return
to him and he had agreed to receive her."2 The issue remaining
was the question whether she should return home alone (a distance
of two miles) or whether the husband should escort her. The court
held that because she insisted upon the escort her separation was
still wrongful. In Martin v. Martin13 a wife locked her husband out
after a quarrel and he then left home. Two weeks later the parties
and their lawyers had a conference in which the wife asked the hus-
band to resume living with her. He refused and she sought an
equitable order for support. The trial court's finding that the husband
was at fault received support from the fact that the wife had re-
quested the husband to return . . . "The court could reasonably find
that the . . . [wife's] conduct had not been such as to justify him in
failing to resume cohabitation at her request, or, in the alternative to
support her."114 It is hard to think that the request, "come home, all
111. See also, Montgomery v. Montgomery, 183 Va. 96, 31 S.E.2d 284 (1944).
This is a tragic case denying separate maintenance to a wife whose husband
paid an unusual amount of attention to his mother. Separate support was de-
nied although the parties were in a situation which probably could no longer
be brought to rights. In Short v. Short, 151 Md. 444, 135 Atl. 176 (1926), a
support order was denied because the husband was not "at fault" although
the opinion indicates that gruffness, indifference, and rudeness had destroyed
the happiness of the marriage. In Maryland a separate maintenance decree is
possible only if the wife has ground for divorce. These examples of broken
human relations left without a reasonable economic adjustment because
of the fault issue could be multiplied many times. Those who like to try
their hand at judging the responsibility for marital breakdown might also
like to consult, Obermire v. Obermire, 232 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. App. 1950).
112. Thomas v. Thomas, 152 Ill. 577, 38 N.E. 794 (1894).
113. 134 Conn. 354, 57 A.2d 622 (1948).
114. Id. at 358, 57 A.2d at 624.
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is forgiven" made at conference upon advice of counsel would be other
than a battle field tactic.
As a practical matter, the fault which must be shown before a
wife or husband may rightfully leave home is often proved by con-
duct which is a product of mental disease. Legal insanity excuses the
misconduct of either party,"5 but mental illness often falls short of
legal insanity. Little psychiatric training is needed to hold the opinion
that the husband adjudicated "at fault" in Irvine v. Irvine"6 was
a sick man. Among other things he believed his wife was poisoning
his children's affection towards him, wrote his wife a letter of praise
and enclosed a copy of divorce complaint with a note saying he hoped
it would never be necessary to file it, and printed a chart for the
routine of his children bearing the legend:
They have to do what they are told. Are made to mind. If they don't
and continue to buck authority, a punishment follows and they are made
to do what they have been asked to do in the first place. No compromise.
The fuss is shortlived and the incident soon forgotten with no ill
feelings remaining.1i 7
Sometimes we can see signs that perhaps "fault," which now must
be shown if a wife is to get support according to her husband's means
and which now can bar a wife's support petition completely should the
husband make such a showing, is becoming only one factor for courts
to consider.
Courts and legislatures have placed responsibility irrespective of
fault upon a husband to provide something for his wife if she is
likely to become a public charge."8 It is commonly said that a wife
need not be blameless to obtain support from her husband if the
main "fault" is his." 9 Most courts while recognizing the husband's
obligation in such circumstances have taken the wife's conduct into
account in setting the amount of the order. For example, the Alabama
court has said:
Overindulgence is not to be shown to a wife whose husband has given
her grounds for separate maintenance, when her own failure to act the
part of a dutiful wife has helped to put her in the position of "having the
law on her side." Such misconduct on the part of the wife may be con-
sidered as in a measure palliating the offense of the husband, and as
abridging her claim to allowance from him for separate maintenance.120
From Minnesota we have Atwood v. Atwood,12' a case holding that
115. Cases are collected in Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 144 (1951).
116. 339 Mich. 375, 63 N.W.2d 618 (1954).
117. Id. at 382, 63 N.W.2d at 621.
118. See People v. Schenkel, 258 N.Y. 224, 179 N.E. 474 (1932).
119. E.g., Holley v. Holley, 257 Ala. 250, 58 So. 2d 783 (1952); Martin v.
Martin, 134 Conn. 354, 57 A.2d 622 (1948).
120. Puckett v. Puckett, 240 Ala. 607, 609, 200 So. 420, 421 (1941).
121. 229 Minn. 333, 39 N.W.2d 103 (1949).
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a wife with two children may receive an order for $500 per month
support for her support and that of her children, even though the
necessity or justification, for living separately was not adjudicated.
The trial court said, "the provisions for the support of plaintiff were
made primarily as a necessary incident to the support order for the
children, and not by reason of any merit on plaintiff's part."'
The law ought to aim at the fairest possible arrangement in each
case rather than to deny liability if the wife is "at fault" and to im-
pose it fully on a guilty husband. To say that the purpose of a sup-
port order is to "right the wrongs of an injured spouse" is to entertain
the most simple-minded point of view about marital discord.123 The
conduct of the parties ought to be decisive of liability only in the
most extreme cases.
When a couple lives together in a marriage they share the fluctua-
tions of fortune naturally. Each in his own way contributes to the
material success of the family enterprise. Statements found in many
opinions would treat separated couples as if such were the case for
them:
The obligation must be . . .fulfilled out of the husband's contempor-
raneous faculties whether in wealth, in moderate means or in poverty.
Within this gamut of fortune the wife shares . . . [C)hange in tangible
property and in income and in earnings may occur as well after ds be-
fore the separation of the spouses. 124
A separated couple is no longer sharing life; there is not the same
reason to share an income. The parties to a marriage, dead in all but
name, no longer contribute to a common enterprise as do those united
in an existing partnership. Courts should fix support claims as justly as
possible at the outset, and then leave the order undisturbed, absent
of showing of unfairness or some other reason having to do with
special need. Courts would recognize that a wife may be given too
much or too little for reasons existing at the time of the order. The
husband may have been unemployed or still at school; the wife may
have had a particular problem of a temporary sort. Later events
such as illness or disability create the need for modification also.
In short, we need flexibility because we are concerned with the ever-
changing human problems but not because we ought to carry out an
ideal appropriate to a going enterprise. In practical terms, a support
order should neither be increased nor decreased simply because the
122. Id. at 339, 39 N.W.2d at 107.
123. Waldrop v. Waldrop, 222 Ala. 625, 627, 134 So. 1, 2 (1931).
Many opinions support quite a different philosophy. "The support laws
were meant to provide reasonable support for a wife, not to penalize an
erring husband," Commonwealth v. Lazarou, 180 Pa. Super. 342, 344, 119 A.2d
605, 607 (1956).
124. Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 499, 15 A.2d 914, 919 (1940).
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husband's income has become greater or less. A showing of other
reasons should be required.
Although I can't demonstrate the proposition, I hazard the guess
that, in spite of the language in many of the cases, few modifications
are actually made because of a change in income alone. In some
instances the modification of support arrangements is not possible at
all. A lump sum award for maintenance and support is not un-
known' 5 and, generally, a reasonable separation agreement sets the
limit on a wife's demand provided the husband has complied with
the contracts.126 At least one trial court judge has expressed his view
that support orders should not be as easily modified as they are in
the New York Family Court.127
Very little consideration has been given to the question whether a
support claim should be cut off at some point. Wives have been
able to assert a claim after ten, fifteen or even twenty years after
separation from her husband. Yet in most cases the need of the wife
will be greatest at the beginning of the period of separation. This
will be particularly true when small children are involved. One of
the strongest practical arguments for awarding maintenance to a
wife is the fact that she may have passed up much by way of eco-
nomic opportunity during the period of homemaking. Time may per-
mit her to gain the place in the economy which her services in the
home have denied her. It may be wise and fair to terminate a sup-
port order, after a wife, by further education, has prepared herself
for employment. Though reversed on appeal, a Florida trial court
may have been moved by factors such as these when it ordered a
husband to pay $17.50 per week for the term of a year.128
Living separately under a support arrangement is a happy way
125. E.g., Wagoner v. Wagoner, 306 Mo. 241, 267 S.W. 654 (1924). Wagoner
is a good example of the persuasive case which can sometimes be made for
the final fixing of support claims. The parties were without hope of re-
conciliation, had been carrying on the most extensive litigation for years,
and were of advanced age.
126. "If . . . support could be increased under her theory it could also be
reduced by the court upon a proper showing of changed circumstances with-
out restoring to her the property with which she had parted. Untold mis-
chief and the disruption of settled financial arrangements of many separated
spouses would result if such agreement could be set at naught." Finnegan v.
Finnegan, 262 P.2d 49, 53 (Cal. App. 1953), aff'd, 42 Cal. 2d 762, 269 P.2d 873
(1954), 43 CAiI. L. REv. 530 (1955). But see Haas v. Haas, 298 N.Y. 69, 80
N.E.2d 337 (1948), holding that the provision for termination of support in a
separation may not be made to depend on conduct of the wife "not fairly
or reasonably related to the marriage relationship."
127. Panken, J., in Klein v. Klein, 87 N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1949).
128. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 53 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1951). See also, Perry v.
Perry, 329 Mass. 771, 110 N.E.2d 498 (1953), in which the trial court decreed
that as soon as the wife was able to work, a $20.00 per week order would be
revoked. In Wood v. Wood, 258 Ala. 72, 61 So. 2d 436 (1952), a husband was
relieved of further alimony payments because his wife was self-supporting
and his children were grown up and married.
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of life for only a few people. The parties are bound by economic
ties without the rewarding personal relations which may ease fi-
nancial burdens. In some states the door is opened to brighter
prospects by allowing divorce irrespective of fault if the parties have
lived under a separation order for a certain period of time. Illinois
enacted an interesting statute in the 30's which permitted the
parties to divorce after two years of living under a separate mainte-
nance order. The act (held unconstitutional in 1936) encouraged
divorce by a provision forbidding, to a childless wife, separate mainte-
nance awards lasting longer than two years.129
Protecting the Public Purse
If a married woman should become the recipient of public assistance
the authorities supplying the needed relief have a claim for reim-
bursement (save for a few early cases) against her husband. 13 0
The general trend of legislation, spurred by mounting relief budgets,
has been to broaden the liability of spouses in assistance cases beyond
the ordinary responsibility of one spouse to another. By force of
modern legislation the wife of an indigent person must support him
and must respond to a claim for reimbursement made by public
officials if she were possessed of sufficient means at the time public
assistance was given.1' 1 More recent legislation would require the
wife to reimburse the state from property acquired after the ex-
penditure of tax funds.132 Generally, legislation provides for the
129. "[Plrovided that there are no living children born of such marriage
no person having once received separate maintenance or temporary alimony
for a period of two (2) years or a fraction thereof shall be entitled to
further separate maintenance or temporary alimony against the same
spouse, except for such portion of the two (2) years as remains unexpired.
..." ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 68, § 22 (1935). This act was held invalid on local
constitutional grounds in DeMotte v. DeMotte, 364 Ill. 421? 4 N.E.2d 960
(1936). Cf. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1955), which limits, initially, an
alimony decree to three years in the case of a childless wife. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 3007d (Supp. 1955), permits the courts to grant a divorce at any time
to a couple living under an order of legal separation.
130. Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N.Y. 513 (1882), is a leading case. The
contrary opinions were based on the idea that poor relief was a work of
public charity and not a response to needs created by the husband's default
Board of Comm'rs of Switzerland County v. Hildebrand, 1 Carter 555 (Ind.
1849). In a more modem case, Haakon County v. Staley, 60 S.D. 87, 243 N.W.
671 (1932), a county sued a husband for necessaries furnished under the
poor laws and for amounts furnished under a mother's aid plan. The county
received reimbursement for the poor relief but not for the mother's pension
payments on the ground that the latter were made pursuant to a public policy
of keeping mothers in the home, a policy for which the husband was not
responsible. In Baldwin v. Douglas County, 37 Neb. 283, 55 N.W. 875 (1893), a
statute permitting a county to recover sums spent for keeping defendant's
wife in a mental institution was held unconstitutional on the ground that
recovery would be a vicious instance of double taxation.
131. E.g., Hodson v. Stapleton, 248 App. Div. 524, 290 N.Y. Supp. 570 (1st
Dep't 1936); State v. Whitver, 71 N.D. 664 3 N.W.2d 457 (1942).
132. E.g., N.Y. Soc. WELFAPE LAw § 104(1): "No claim of a public welfare
official against the estate ...shall be barred or defeated . . . by any lack
of sufficiency of ability . . . during the period assistance and care were re-
ceived."
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making of orders for periodic payments to an indigent spouse.
Typically, these orders may be entered on the petition of the authori-
ties. Indeed, under the Pennsylvania statute, they apparently may
be granted at the instance of a private charitable institution caring for
the needy partner.133
A husband or a wife may find himself with a duty to make pay-
ments not because the other spouse is deserving but because the tax-
payer is to be protected. In People v. Schenkel'3 a husband was
convicted as a "disorderly person" for having neglected to provide for
his wife despite the contention that, by her conduct, she had forfeited
her right to support.
[The] duty of provision is absolute and regardless of the wife's fault.
The public interest, in the opinion of the Legislature, requires that the
husband, not the taxpayer, shall bear the burden of her support as long
as the relationship of husband and wife is not altered or dissolved by
decree of the court.1 35
Under the New York Domestic Relations Court Act the Domestic
Relations Court of New York City may order support payments ir-
respective of fault, if the unsupported partner is, or is likely to become,
a public charge.13 The amount of the award is supposed to be just
enough to keep the pauper off the public assistance list.
On the other hand, in England and many American states the normal
support rules linking responsibility and fault remain unchanged even
when the government makes a claim. 37 A husband need not pay back
the state for assistance given a wife wrongfully separated from him.
If the New York statute is sound in some cases in that the innocent
marriage partner may often have a greater responsibility for the care
of the guilty one than the general public, the act surely goes too far
in other instances. To hold a husband or wife liable for welfare pay-
ments made to a runaway spouse, gone from home for ten or twenty
years is to protect the taxpayer by jungle warfare.138 Under the New
133. Commonwealth v. Kotzker, 179 Pa. Super. 251, 118 A.2d 271 (1955).
134. 258 N.Y. 224, 179 N.E. 474 (1932).
135. Id. at 227-28, 179 N.E. at 475, 476.
136. Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N.Y. Supp. 221 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1937).
137. State v. Jordan, 142 Conn. 375, 114 A.2d 694 (1955); Town of Milton
v. Bruso, 111 Vt. 82, 10 A.2d 203 (1940). The authoritative English case is
National Assistance Bd. v. Wilkinson, [1952] 2 Q.B. 648.
"But the widening of the new statutory liability of the wife for the sup-
port of her husband is a revolutionary piece of legislation without warrant
in previous poor law or family law: it marks indeed a further step towards
that complete equality of the sexes before the law which has characterized
much of the legal development of the last century." Brown, National As-
sistance and The Liability to Maintain One's Family, 18 MODERN L. REv.
110, 116-17 (1955).
138. The following is a summary of the views of an Iowa trial judge
holding unconstitutional a statute placing a lien on the land of a wife for the
old-age assistance payments given to her absent husband; the trial judge was
reversed on appeal: '"n the finding of fact and conclusion of law the trial
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York law taxpayer protection is accomplished by shifting auto-
matically the burden of supporting the poor to husbands or wives
provided they have means to supply. In some instances the law
has recognized that determining which of several persons should bear
the cost of state aid is a matter for the careful exercise of discretion
on a case by case basis.139 In a similar way a look into the particular
circumstances would answer with greater fairness the question
whether the taxpayer or the marriage partner should pay the relief
bill. In deciding whether the public or the wife should pay to a
pauper husband, is it not helpful to know that the wife, abandoned
by her mate twelve years ago, is 61, has gall bladder trouble, possesses
$1618.05 in a dwindling bank account and receives an income of only
ten dollars a week?140 She has some means. She can work. She is still
his wife. Even so, in such a case it would be just for the taxpayers to
forego both repayment and the protection of an order that this luckless
wife make periodic payments to her husband.
court stated that the facts had a 'lot of equitable appeal'. The court was
of the opinion that during the time plaintiff and Oliver Thomas were separated
the family relationship ceased to exist between them; that for all practical
purposes the marriage between them had ceased to exist and that, all that
remained was the 'mere naked relationship' of husband and wife. The court
further held that the old-age assistance furnished her husband was of no
benefit to plaintiff and that as she was under no legal duty to support him
there could be no valid lien placed upon her property for aid furnished to
him." Thomas v. State, 241 Iowa 1072, 1075, 44 N.W.2d 410, 411 (1950).
Although Judge Musmanno of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is often
given to dramatic overstatement, I agree with his point of view as stated in
this paragraph from Department of Public Assistance v. Sharago, 381 Pa.
74, 112 A.2d 162, 163 (1955): "The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania seeks
in this case ... to collect from ... a 72 year-old widow, $1,181.74 which ad-
mittedly she never received, never contracted to pay, and benefits from which
never entered her sphere of enjoyment. For the State to impose such a
palpable injustice requires specific authority in law which cannot be found
in all the books of Pennsylvania."
The imposition of liability as an exercise of power without justice is
illustrated by Gilpin v. Gilpin, 197 Misc. 319, 94 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1950). The defendant, without knowing it, had married a woman al-
ready married. She became pregnant (so he says) without the husband's help.
The court ordered him to pay $150.00 for medical expenses in connection
with the birth without investigating the facts about paternity. The de-
fendant's argument that he was responsible for neither the wife nor the
child was brushed aside with the statement: "After all, the husband did
marry the mother even if he was deceived."
139. E.g., in Wisconsin whether the patient or her husband should bear the
cost of care in a public institution is a matter of judgment by the officials of
government in each case. In re Sykora's Guardianship, 271 Wis. 455, 74 N.W.
2d 164 (1956). See also, the opinion of Judge Sicker in Posner v. -Posner,
201 Misc. 432, 110 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952). The Judge sug-
gests that should a husband be indigent, a wife does not necessarily bear
the whole burden of his support to the exclusion of the children. He would
proceed simultaneously against the wife and the children so that a fair order
can be made taking into account all the circumstances. See the flexible
scheme set forth in Mallatt v. Luihn, 294 P.2d 871 (Ore. 1956).
140. These are the facts in Posner v. Posner, 110 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1952).
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Remedies
A wife living with her husband has almost no remedy to enforce her
right to support except her personal persuasiveness. We must say
"almost" because both self help and pledging the husband's credit for
the purchase of necessaries are, theoretically, means of enforcing a
wife's rights against a spouse with whom she lives.
A woman may take matters into her own hands and use the hus-
band's money to discharge his obligation. For this purpose, she may
use all the money from a note owned partly by him,141 withdraw
all the funds in a joint checking account'42 or spend the proceeds of
property he has empowered her to sell.143 In few cases will this way
of getting support money be very helpful for very long.
The classic remedy is the wife's power to pledge her husband's
credit for her necessaries. There is a great deal of confusion surround-
ing this remedy which ought to be dispelled.4 Unfortunately courts
often refer to this power as an "agency of necessity" and much of
the language is in terms of the agency law. We should first point out
that a husband-wife relationship often involves a true agency of one
spouse acting for the other as might be the case if two persons,
not married, were living together in a common household. The ap-
parent authority of a wife acting for a husband; the position of a
husband as an undisclosed principal; the effect of a husband's ratifica-
tion of a wife's purchases are all agency problems as much as any
but they have little to do with the question of a wife's right
to support. One important difference between the two matters lies
in the fact that a husband can terminate the agency relationship by
notifying those who deal with his wife but not so her power to pledge
his credit to supply necessaries for her support. It should be noted
that, in a given transaction, credit may be extended to the wife
personally rather than to the husband. Should that be the case
the seller can look only to the wife for payment.145
. Only the main outlines of the husband's liability to suppliers of
necessaries need be given because it is not an important means of
enforcing a husband's support duty. The reason is -quite simple. A
husband may have defenses against the supplier which are difficult for
the business man to discover. Furthermore, even if a husband is
141. Whittle v. Whittle, 5 Cal. App. 696, 91 Pac. 170 (1907).
142. Kaufmann. v. Kaufmann, 166 Pa. Super. 6, 70 A.2d 481 (1950).
143. Henderson v. Henderson, 208 Miss. 98, 43 So. 2d 871 (1950).
144. Smedly v. Sweeten, 11 N.J. Super. 39, 77 A.2d 489 (App. Div. 1950), is
a helpful discussion. See also Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 47 Atl. 80 (1900).
Johnson v. Briscoe, 104 Mo. App. 493, 79 S.W. 498 (1904), is a good example of
a true husband-wife agency problem.
145. E.g., Mather-Groover Co. v. Roberts, 54 Ga. App. 398, 187 S.E. 913
(1936); Mathews Furniture Co. v. La Bella, 44 So. 2d 160 (La. 1950); Saks &
Co. v. Barrett, 109 N.J.L. 42, 160 Atl. 405 (1932).
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liable, the merchant may be able to convince him only after bringing
an expensive action in court.
A husband may defend on the ground that his wife is wrongfully
separated from him, a question beyond the competence of most credit
departments. 146 He is liable for her necessaries only if he has not
already provided them.147 A merchant will not readily be able to
tell if a wife is buying her first or second pair of shoes. In addition, the
seller must guess at how appropriate the purchase is. The husband
is liable only for "necessaries" a term which should be distinguished
from "necessities." "Necessaries" are those items appropriate to
wife's station in life.148 What a wife may properly buy and require
her husband to pay for will vary greatly from one marriage to an-
other. Perhaps the point can be made by reverting to a relatively
recent New York case holding that whale meat and caviar are
necessaries because "in the gilded world wherein the Benjamins
moved, whale meat and caviar may very well have been regarded as
plain but honorable fare."' 49
Not many merchants will supply necessaries to a wife over a
period of time in return for a doubtful claim against her husband, but
a member of the wife's family or a friend may be willing to provide
funds for her support. If so, the amounts spent can be recovered from
the husband provided, again, that the money was spent for neces-
saries, that he has not supplied them, that he was liable to do so
and, further, that the sums were not intended as a gift.150
In some states a wife, separated from her husband, who has the
estate or the earnings to provide her own maintenance may recoup
expenditures in an action against her husband. This result has
been reached without the aid of a specific statute on the theory that
the Married Women's Acts of the nineteenth century have ex-
tinguished the husband's claim to his wife's earnings and have given
146. E.g., Cowell v. Phillips, 17 R.I. 188, 20 Atl. 933 (1890); Gimbel Bros.
v. Adams, 178 Wis. 590, 190 N.W. 357(1922).
147. Keller v. Phillips, 39 N.Y. 351 (1868), is a leading case. The merchant's
position was made difficult by placing upon him the burden of proving the
failure to provide. See also, e.g., Guthrie v. Bobo, 32 Ala. 355, 26 So. 2d
203 (1946); Saks & Co. v. Bennett, 12 N.J. Super. 316, 79 A.2d 479 (1951);
McCreery & Co. v. Martin, 84 N.J.L. 626, 87 Atl. 433 (1913).
148. The opinion in Woodward & Perkins v. Barnes, 43 Vt. 330 (1871), con-
tains a typical statement defining "necessaries." See also Labadie v. Henry,
132 Okla. 252, 270 Pac. 57 (1928); Hinton Dept. Co. v. Lilly, 105 W. Va. 126, 141
S.E. 629 (1928).
149. Bloomingdale Bros., Inc. v. Benjamin, 200 Misc. 1108, 1110, 112 N.Y.S.2d
33, 35 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951).
The price of a lawyer to defend a murder case on appeal after conviction
has been held a ' necessary." Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P.2d 953 (1949).
150. E.g., Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510 (1880). Skinner v. Tirrell, 159
Mass. 474, 34 N.E. 692 (1893), is the leading case denying recovery for money
advanced a wife. The Skinner decision has not been widely followed. In
Taylor v. Brown, 195 Misc. 840, 91 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1949),
a wife's sister failed to recover because the court believed that she did not
extend credit to the husband but made a gift to the wife.
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a wife the power to sue her husband.' 5' The remedy has also been
created by legislation.
5 2
To recover money spent, of course, is not at all satisfactory relief
if the wife has no money to spend nor someone who is willing to
advance the funds. Unless the husband is cooperative new actions
must be brought periodically. A court, faced with a claim based on
a part of a year's expenditure, will have difficulty in determining
the amount which would be proper to spend on annual basis. In
Benjamin v. Benjamin'53 the New York court attempted to control
the annual rate of expenditure by announcing, in an opinion allowing
recovery for a wife's expenses during four months, that a certain sum
would be "approximately the maximum that would be recoverable for
necessaries in any one year.'
u54
For most women entitled to support yet not wishing a divorce the
only truly practical remedy is an order providing for periodic pay-
ments.
Some way of providing weekly or monthly payments to a wife is
probably available in every state although the particular method is
not the same everywhere. Most states which have considered the
question will grant separate support under the general powers of a
court of equity.155 The others provide the remedy by statute.
Courts, giving relief by invoking inherent equity powers, found
little helpful precedent in the English materials because in England
matrimonial matters were in the charge of the ecclesiastical courts.
Those American courts permitting the equitable proceeding have
emphasized the separated wife's inadequate remedy at law, as well
as the multiplicity of suits necessary to gain her objective, as grounds
for granting a support order. To these reasons have been added the
points that (1) a wronged woman should not be forced to resort to
divorce with attendant alimony and (2) a husband has a duty of a
high moral order which he should not be permitted to evade.
151. "The plainest principles of justice require that a wife should have some
adequate legal redress upon such a state of facts as that set forth in this
complaint, and the beneficial character of our legislation removing the
former disabilities of married women could not be evidenced more forcibly
than it is in its application to the present case." DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere,
203 N.Y. 460, 461, 96 N.E. 722, 723 (1911). In Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray,
278 N.Y. 380, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1938), it was held that the committee of an insane
wife's estate could recover for necessaries provided by the estate after the
adjudication of insanity although when possessed of her reason she had ap-
parently preferred to provide for herself without looking to the husband for
support. See also, Sodowsky v. Sodowsky, 51 Okla. 689, 152 Pac. 390 (1915);
Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. 508, 90 A.2d 389 (1952).
152. E.g., CoNx. GEN. STAT. § 7308 (1949).
153. 283 App. Div. 455, 128 N.Y.S.2d 401 (ist Dep't 1954).
154. Id. at 458, 128 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
155. Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265 (1869), is a leading case. See also,
Radermacher v. Radermacher, 61 Idaho 261, 100 P.2d 955 (1940); Heflin v.
Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941); Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73
S.E. 716 (1912). The cases are collected in Annot., 141 A.L.R. 399 (1942).
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The inherent power of equity may be recognized even though a
statute providing for a similar statutory action exists'5 or there is a
provision making the failure to support a crime.157 In at least one
state, repeal of the statutory limited divorce did not destroy the ex-
istence of the equitable suit for separate support. 15 8 It has been held
that a support order can be given only in a proceeding directed to
that end alone.159 In others, if either party seeks a divorce (every-
where an action authorized by statute only), a maintenance order may
be made in the same action although a divorce is denied.160
Apart from express statutory provisions the courts have no power
to give a wife any portion of the husband's property by way of
separate maintenance. 161 The order does not terminate the marital
status and a wife has no interest save dower in her husband's ac-
cumulated separate property. Furthermore, a conveyance of property
to the wife might make reconciliation more difficult. Some courts
have permitted the use and occupancy of real property to be decreed
the wife162 while others have not even permitted that remedy. In
the latter case the rule is easy to circumvent. In Radermacher V.
Radermacher,'63 the court admitted that no power existed to provide
a wife with the family house in which to live but noted that she was
in possession of it and indicated that if the husband repossessed it
the amount of the payments to his wife would be increased. Also
the amounts given a wife may be made a lien on the real property
of the husband.
The award given either in equity or under a separate support statute
will be enforced by the contempt power. The danger of unfair
harassment by contempt proceedings has been given as a reason for
refusing to enter a support order against a husband without means.
164
The duty to provide support is not a debt within the meaning of con-
stitutional provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt; therefore the
person of a non-complying husband may be attached.165 The obliga-
156. E.g., Du Pont v. Du Pont, 32 Del. Ch. 130, 79 A.2d 680 (1951).
157. E.g., Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941).
158. Barich v. Barich, 201 Minn. 34, 275 N.W. 421 (1937).
159. E.g., the trial court in Buss v. Buss, 252 Wis. 500, 32 N.W.2d 253
(1948).
160. E.g., Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190, 81 P.2d 731 (1938).
161. E.g., Rowe v. Rowe, 256 Ala. 491, 55 So. 2d 749 (1951); Brown v.
Brown, 204 Md. 197, 103 A.2d 856 (1954).
162. E.g., Polander v. Polander, 338 Mich. 646, 62 N.W.2d 449 (1954).
163. 61 Idaho 261, 100 P.2d 955 (1940).
164. Roberts v. Roberts, 22 Tenn. App. 651, 125 S.W.2d 199 (W.S. 1938).
No decree will be granted unless the husband fails to support in fact. Mere
nervousness about future conduct is not a sufficient ground. Bingham v.
Bingham, 325 Mo. 596, 29 S.W.2d 99 (1930). On this point see also Mark
v. Mark, 145 Ohio St.'301, 61 N.E.2d 595 (1945). But see Morden v. Morden,
119 Wash. 176, 205 Pac. 377 (1922).
165. Commonwealth v. Berfield, 160 Pa. Super. 438, 51 A.2d 523 (1947),
contains a concise summary of a wife's position in enforcing a support order.
See also Annot., 30 A.L.R. 130 (1924).
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tion under a support order is not discharged by bankruptcy nor as a
general matter is a wife prevented from enforcing her support claim
by invading a spendthrift trust.166 A wife has been permitted to garn-
ish a pension fund protected by legislation against the claims of
"creditors" but not a similar fund exempt from garnishment "or
any other process.' ' 67 She, of course, can take advantage of the statutes
which permit fraudulent conveyances to be set aside.
168
Some courts have found problems in awarding support pendente
lite during the course of matrimonial action. The right to support
order during a period of matrimonial litigation should follow from
the general right to support but in some states the court can give an
order only if authorized by statute. 69 In contrast with the obligation
under the general duty of support, maintenance pendente lite is often
given only when the wife is without means.7 0
In theory, the amount of a periodic award is, ordinarily, for the dis-
cretion of the trial court. The appellate courts repeat over and over
again that the trial judge has the best opportunity to make a judg-
ment on the basis of the detail which he has heard personally. A re-
versal is proper only upon showing an abuse of discretion or at least
after giving proper "weight" to the exercise of discretion by the court
below.171 Yet appellate courts do reverse or modify with considerable
frequency. The wisdom of appellate modification of a decree is some-
times raised in opinions but most appellate courts apparently feel free
to increase or decrease an award on the basis of the record on ap-
peal. 72 The difficulty of judging the proper amount using only the
printed testimony may be a less important consideration than the
delay of remand with the attendant possibility of a second appeal. 73
In every state but one the failure to support a wife may be a crime.
These statutes vary somewhat in the definition of the crime. The
Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act proscribes deserting and
166. In re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 802 (1927), is the leading.
case.
167. Compare Zwingmann v. Zwingmann, 150 App. Div. 358, 134 N.Y. Supp.
1077 (2d Dep't 1912), with Commonwealth v. Mooney, 172 Pa. Super. 30, 92
A.2d 258 (1952).
168. Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266, 47 Pac. 37 (1896).
169. See Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N.W.2d 554 (1949), limiting
the power to order payments pendente lite to those specifically authorized
by statute.
170. Jennings v. Jennings, 78 R.I. 139, 79 A.2d 920 (1951), tells of an in-
teresting argument under a Rhode Island statute.
171. E.g., Cairnes v. Cairnes, 211 Ala. 342, 100 So. 317 (1924); Coe v. Coe,
313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943).
172. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 204 Md. 197, 103 A.2d 856 (1954) (appellate
court increased an award from $50.00 to $100.00 per week); Gross v. Gross, 22
N.J. Super. 407, 92 A.2d 71 (App. Div. 1952) (award increased from $125.00 to
$175.00 per week). In Waldrop v. Waldrop 222 Ala. 625, 134 So. 1 (1931),
the appellate court reduced an order from $60.00 to $50.00 per month.
173. The majority and dissenting opinions in Du Pont v. Du Pont, 103 A.2d
234 (Del. 1954), consider the question of the appellate role very carefully.
The opinions are worth reading.
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willfully neglecting or refusing without just cause, to support and
maintain a wife in necessitous circumstances.17 4 The impact of the
criminal law will not be of much help to enforce support duties in
many cases if the crime only embraces the failure to support a wife
reduced to destitution. Many states, in recognition of this limitation, do
not confine the criminal offense to such circumstances. 175 The require-
ment that the husband's neglect be "willfull" gives a non-supporting
spouse his first line of defense. Many prosecutors have tripped on
that hurdle.176
The criminal penalty does not, of itself, produce any money for an
unsupported wife. The statutes have attacked this problem in several
ways. Typically, the courts are given the power to suspend the
sentence and to put the defendant on probation upon the condition
that he pay his wife a certain sum for her support. The promise of
the defendant is often guaranteed by the posting of a bond.177 If the
defendant husband must be jailed or imprisoned the state may be
required to turn over to the wife a certain sum for each day of labor
performed by the prisoner.17 8
As a practical matter these criminal proceedings are ordinarily em-
ployed in support problems of persons on the lowest rung of the
economic ladder. For people in such circumstances the remedy has
some useful features. The criminal penalty can be imposed without
any separation of the husband and wife. Furthermore, the wife need
not hire a lawyer to begin a private action; she will be able to use
the services of the court prosecutor. In many places, the courts may
require the defendant's payments be made to a government agency
rather than the wife herself. If so she need not call upon a lawyer
to enforce payment as she would in a private action.179 The dereliction
of the husband is brought to the attention of the authorities immedi-
ately.
174. The Uniform Act, now withdrawn by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, is the subject of 10 U.L.A. (1922), a volume still valuable for re-
search into the criminal law of desertion and non-support. The volume counts
24 states as having some form of the Uniform Act. The various forms which
the Uniform Act takes in the 24 states and appellate court cases arising under
the various acts are found in 10 U.L.A. (1922), which provides the principal
documentation for the text statements respecting the criminal sanction.
175. An example is Maryland. Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66
(1955), is recommended as an instructive opinion on the subject of criminal
non-support.
176. E.g., State v. Thurmes, 233 Minn. 153, 46 N.W.2d 258 (1951).
177. It has been held that, upon the husband's default and imprisonment
the bond may be taken not only to pay sums past due but also to make
periodic payments until the bond has been spent. The person liable on the
undertaking unsuccessfully argued that two payments were thus being made:
one by the imprisonment, the other by the bond. People v. Faculak, 325 Mich.
56, 37 N.W.2d 709 (1949).
178. See § 7 of the UNiroam DEsERTION AND NoN-SUPPORT ACT, 10 U.L.A.
77-83 (1922), and 10 U.L.A. 43-44 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
179. Boswell, Probation in Non-support Cases, Crime Prevention Through
Law, 1952 N.P.P.A. YEARBOOK 156, tells of the work of enforcement in Marion
County, Indiana (Indianapolis).
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Because these proceedings are criminal, the protective rules of the
criminal law respecting such things as the sufficiency of the accusa-
tion, the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence and the right to
jury trial (if the offense is, in a given state, within the class of those
entitled to a jury trial) are usually available to the defendant.
180
Proposals for bettering the remedial scheme have been directed to
these principal objectives: (1) to improve enforcement procedures,
(2) to improve techniques for getting at the facts, (3) to set up a
family court, (4) to take into account the fact that a support pro-
ceeding is evidence of the breakdown of marital relations and not
simply a matter of economics.
Enforcement procedures have been improved. The Uniform Re-
ciprocal Non-Support Acts have greatly facilitated the collection of
support orders across state lines. A detailed description of this legisla-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.18 Suffice it to say the act
permits a wife to start non-support proceedings in her home state
and the husband will be compelled to respond in his. A husband who
successfully runs away is becoming a rare bird. One of the great
intrastate problems is how to secure payment for a wife without
making it necessary to get a lawyer and begin contempt proceedings
(which can be long drawn out and costly) if her husband is in de-
fault. In some places payment is ordered not to the wife personally
but to a state or city agency so the enforcement can be quick and
inexpensive.182 In this way also, the record of payments made is
apt to be accurate.
Getting at the facts in family litigation is exceedingly difficult if
evidence gathering is left to the parties. Such lawsuits are almost
sure to be charged with emotion and therefore the parties are not
likely to present the court a balanced picture. Important facts can
often be concealed by one party from the other. Some states have
given the courts the means of making an independent investigation
by authorizing the employment of social workers to make case
studies in support matters. 83 Presumably the social workers can
180. E.g., State v. Thurmes, 233 Minn. 153, 46 N.W.2d 258 (1951) (proof be-
yond reasonable doubt); May v. State, 153 Neb. 369, 44 N.W.2d 636 (1950)
(sufficiency of accusation and accuracy of charge to the jury). The May
case actually was a prosecution for failure to support a child rather than a
wife. However, the crimes are practically identical save for the person in
need of support.
181. See Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2
ST. Louis U.L.J. 12 (1952).
182. See Boswell, supra note 179.
183. "Upon request by the court, state police, local police or probation officers
shall make an investigation in relation to any proceeding hereunder and re-
port to the court. Every such report shall be in writing and shall become
part of the records of such proceedings." MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 209, § 32 (1955).
See also N.Y.C. DoM. REL. CT. ACT §§ 113-17. Gelhorn's fine study, CHIL-
DREN AND FA1\mnES IN T=E COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY, (1954), reaches the
conclusion, after a careful review of the facts, that "the Domestic Relations
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make a useful evaluation of the total family picture so judges will
be better able to decide whether an award should be made and, if
so, how much should be given.
Support problems are closely related to many other legal questions
of domestic relations. Family litigation can take many forms and
give rise to a set of legally different problems that ought to be cared
for in the same court. As many as possible of the legal problems re-
lated to intrafamily troubles ought to be brought before the same
court. If assault and battery between husband and wife is a matter for
one court and non-support for another and divorce for a third, et
cetera, a single case of family disorganization and disharmony may
be completely fragmentized by the court system. Proposals for family
courts with adequate facilities for social work assistance and with a
wide scope of jurisdiction have often been made.184 In a few places
the proposals have become the reality.
A family court with broad jurisdiction could hope to get at the
basic reasons for family trouble. In such a court a support problem
would appear as a part of a total picture. In a few places family
courts with conciliation services have been set up and, in those places
a significant number of successes have been reported.185 Setting up
conciliation services may run into constitutional difficulties. For
example, Illinois has made two attempts to but the Illinois Supreme
Court has blocked both efforts on state constitutional grounds.180
There would seem to be an especially strong argument for giving ad-
vice and guidance in a support proceeding. While it is true that in
most cases the marriage is in serious danger yet it has not been de-
stroyed completely. The irrevocable step has not been taken. A
petition for a support order should be a signal for a thorough in-
vestigation into the situation of the parties, not only to determine
what the wife ought to have but also what, if anything, can be done
to save the family.
Court has been asked to perform a potentially great public service-and has
been denied the means of doing so." Id. at 466.
184. An especially good factual study accompanied by a family court pro-
posal is Gelhorn, op. cit. supra note 183. See also NEw YORK LEGISLATIVE Doc.
No. 18, REPORT OF THE TEmpORARY COMM'ISSION ON THE COURTS 50-69 (1956).
185. Efforts at conciliation are directed by N.Y.C. Dom. REL. CT. ACT § 118.
The results of conciliation attempts in Seattle, Los Angeles, Toledo and
Cleveland are summarized in NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE Doc. No. 18, op. cit.
supra note 184, at 65-66.
186. People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262
(1954); People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, 91 N.E.2d 588 (1950). The
Illinois legislature made another attempt at setting up conciliation procedures
in the 1955 session.
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